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TURBULENCE AHEAD: WHY THE FIRST DOMESTIC
AIRCRAFT CARBON EMISSIONS REGULATIONS ARE A
DANGER TO CLIMATE PROTECTION
TAYLOR WILLIAMS*
ABSTRACT
Reducing emission levels from transportation is one of the
most vital steps in combating climate change, but domestic air-
craft were not subject to this kind of regulation until recently. In
July 2020, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) pro-
posed the first carbon emission standards for airplanes. While
this regulatory move appears to be progress for protecting the
environment, it locked in current emissions levels for years to
come. The overwhelming majority of aircraft models are already
6% more efficient than the new standard requires them to be.
The rule highlights the tension between industry considerations
and environmental justice.
This Comment seeks to analyze the various shortcomings of
the new aircraft carbon emission standards. It does so by first
examining the preceding legal history of emissions regulation
and the specifics of the new rule. It then examines the United
States’ obligations to the International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion, the Clean Air Act requirements, the aviation industry’s own
developments, and the level of deference granted to the EPA’s
decision. In order to adequately protect the climate and satisfy
each of these legal demands, the EPA must reconsider more
stringent standards.
* Winner, 2021 International Aviation Womens Association Scholarship.
Candidate for Juris Doctor, SMU Dedman School of Law, May 2022; B.B.A. in
Economics and Business Fellows, Baylor University, 2019. The author would like
to thank her family and friends for their endless support and encouragement.
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I. INTRODUCTION
BETWEEN 2009 AND 2019, the global airline industry’s reve-nue grew 5.3% per year.1 In 2019, this growth hit $838 bil-
lion.2 There are over 100,000 commercial flights each day,
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transporting over 10 million passengers.3 This growth provides
more than just broader and easier travel; it pushed the transpor-
tation industry to become the “center of our socio-economic
fabric.”4 The aviation industry has changed every aspect of soci-
ety, and the environment is no exception.5 Aircraft noise im-
pacts people living near airports, pollutants contaminate water
sources through airport runoff, and aircraft emissions affect air
quality and the climate at large.6
For example, Brian Gannon and his children live in Boston,
Massachusetts, near Logan Airport.7 They often smell exhaust
and fumes from planes throughout their home, neighborhood,
and school.8 Brian frequently makes his children come back in-
side on days when the fumes are severe.9 His neighborhood has
higher COPD and asthma instances than other areas farther
away from the airport, likely due to aircraft emissions.10 Brian
and other individuals who testified at the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) public hearing on aircraft carbon emission
standards are frustrated, left with only empty promises for a
cleaner future.11 Residents and community members begged
the EPA to consider their exposure to toxins from greenhouse
gas emissions when promulgating the new rules.12 The EPA ulti-
mately ignored these pleas when it finalized its rule on aircraft
greenhouse gas emission standards.
In July 2020, for the first time in the United States, the EPA
proposed a rule regulating carbon dioxide emissions from do-
3 Future of Aviation, INT’L CIV. AVIATION ORG., https://www.icao.int/Meetings/
FutureOfAviation/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/AA9L-FDPU].
4 Id.
5 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., OFF. OF ENV’T & ENERGY, AVIATION EMISSIONS, IMPACTS




7 EPA, EPA–HQ–OAR–2018–0276, PUBLIC HEARING FOR PROPOSAL–CONTROL
OF AIR POLLUTION FROM AIRPLANES AND AIRPLANE ENGINES: GHG EMISSION STAN-
DARDS AND TEST PROCEDURES 83 (2020), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/
files/2020-10/documents/airplane-ghg-stnds-nprm-hearing-transcript-20200-09-
17.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4Y2-EE4Q] [hereinafter PUBLIC HEARING].
8 Id. at 83–84.
9 Id. at 84.
10 Id. at 83–84.
11 See id. at 41, 68, 77, 83, 91.
12 See id.
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mestic airplanes and aircraft engines.13 The EPA touts the new
rule as a major success in the fight for environmental protec-
tion.14 However, as this Comment will discuss, the rule falls short
in countless ways. The EPA over-relies on unfounded concerns
for industry and global standards. The EPA disregards congres-
sional mandates to reduce emissions by accepting an obsolete
regulatory scheme. Further, the EPA does not adequately con-
sider alternative regulations. In order to combat climate change
and follow the requirements of the Clean Air Act (CAA), the
EPA must go back to the drawing board and create more strin-
gent standards.
Reaching this conclusion requires an overview of climate
change in the context of aviation (Section II), a consideration of
preceding legislation and regulatory action for carbon dioxide
emissions (Section III), a synopsis on what the new regulations
entail (Section IV), and an examination of the rule’s shortcom-
ings (Section V). Lastly, the conclusion will pull these issues to-
gether and emphasize the necessity for more stringent standards
on carbon dioxide emissions from aircraft.
II. CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE CONTEXT OF AVIATION
While the new aircraft emissions rule specifically addresses
carbon dioxide emissions, a general understanding of green-
house gases and climate change is necessary to understand the
importance of the standards. Greenhouse gases trap heat inside
the atmosphere.15 Higher concentrations of these gases cause
global temperatures to rise.16 Scientists find that the increase in
global warming causes climate change to accelerate, which can
13 Control of Air Pollution from Airplanes and Airplane Engines: GHG Emis-
sion Standards and Test Procedures, 86 Fed. Reg. 2136 (Jan. 11, 2021) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 87, 1030).
14 See Cirium, US Plan for Aircraft CO2 Standards Criticised by Green Groups, FLIGHT-
GLOBAL (July 23, 2020), https://www.flightglobal.com/engines/us-plan-for-air
craft-co2-standards-criticised-by-green-groups/139454.article [https://perma.cc/
B54R-SHPP].
15 Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Overview of Greenhouse Gases, EPA, https://
www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases [https://perma.cc/
T9GU-YDYK] (Apr. 14, 2021).
16 Melissa Denchak, Greenhouse Effect 101, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL (July 16,
2019), https://www.nrdc.org/stories/greenhouse-effect-101 [https://perma.cc/
4FS9-ZGFU]; What is the Greenhouse Effect?, NASA, https://climate.nasa.gov/faq/
19/what-is-the-greenhouse-effect [https://perma.cc/CE6V-X44D] (July 8, 2021).
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lead to rising sea levels, droughts, floods, and extreme tempera-
tures.17 Additionally, climate change impacts health.18
The four main greenhouse gases include carbon dioxide,
methane, nitrous oxide, and fluorinated gases.19 Of these four
gases, carbon dioxide contributed about 80% of greenhouse
gases emitted in 2019.20 Carbon dioxide enters the atmosphere
from burning fossil fuels and typically remains in the atmos-
phere for extremely long periods of time.21 After carbon dioxide
is emitted, “40 percent still remains [in the atmosphere] after
100 years, 20 percent after 1,000 years, and 10 percent as long as
10,000 years later.”22
Globally, aircraft account for 2% of carbon emissions that
contribute to climate change.23 Flights from U.S. destinations
contribute nearly 25% of those emissions.24 In the United States,
emissions from covered aircraft accounts for 3% of total domes-
tic greenhouse gas emissions.25 Before July 2020, airplanes and
jets were the largest transportation source in the United States
not subject to greenhouse gas emissions regulations.26 Although
new technology is developing, an increase in travel and global
aviation creates a net increase in greenhouse gas emissions.27
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) predicted
that carbon dioxide emissions from international aviation could
increase by nearly 69% between 2010 and 2020.28 It also pre-
17 The Causes of Climate Change, NASA, https://climate.nasa.gov/causes [https:/
/perma.cc/TDT2-NCUR] (July 8, 2021).
18 Karen Feldscher, Greenhouse Gases Pose Threat to Public Health, HARV. T.H.
CHAN SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH (Nov. 1, 2011), https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/
news/features/bernstein-greenhouse-gases-health-threat [https://perma.cc/
7ZWR-KYVU].
19 Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Overview of Greenhouse Gases, supra note 15.
20 Id.
21 Denchak, supra note 16.
22 Id.
23 Timothy Puko, EPA Proposes Emissions Limits for Jet Aircraft, WALL ST. J. (July
22, 2020, 1:41 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/epa-proposes-emissions-limits-
for-jet-aircraft-11595429280 [https://perma.cc/ZQC5-KZ2N].
24 Id.
25 Kerry Lynch, EPA Sets Stage to Regulate Aircraft GHG Emissions, AINONLINE





28 Stephen Lee, First Carbon Limits for Airplanes in U.S. Proposed By EPA (1),
BLOOMBERG L. (July 22, 2020, 11:45 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/envi-
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dicted that “[b]y 2045, fuel consumption is projected to increase
. . . 3.1 times the 2015 value.”29
Although some of these statistics may appear nominal, the
growth of aircraft emissions is snowballing quickly. In light of
the growing climate change crisis, legislative bodies—domestic
and abroad—are promulgating new laws and regulations to
combat the increasing problem.
III. PRECEDING LEGISLATION AND REGULATORY
ACTION
The historical background of the EPA’s new carbon emissions
rule is complex and nonlinear. Standards have developed from
both international and U.S. emissions regulations. This Section
explores the major highlights of climate change law and carbon
emissions regulations. Specifically, it addresses the Kyoto Proto-
col and Paris Agreement, the Chicago Convention and ICAO,
the Clean Air Act, the 2016 EPA Endangerment Findings, and
recent U.S. lawsuits relevant to these new standards.
A. KYOTO PROTOCOL AND PARIS AGREEMENT
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change led to some of the first global efforts to control climate
change.30 This convention produced both the Kyoto Protocol
and the Paris Agreement.31 The Kyoto Protocol requires partici-
pating countries to reduce their emissions and delegate interna-
tional aviation to ICAO.32 The Paris Agreement created a goal to
limit the increase in global temperature to 1.5 degrees Celsius
ronment-and-energy/epa-kicks-off-effort-to-regulate-greenhouse-gases-from-air-
planes [https://perma.cc/D7QZ-P6T4].
29 Ewelina Czapla, Regulating Airplane Greenhouse Gas Emissions, AM. ACTION F.
(July 24, 2020), https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/regulating-air-
plane-greenhouse-gas-emissions [https://perma.cc/788Z-P9J7].
30 What is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change?, UNITED
NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/pro-
cess-and-meetings/the-convention/what-is-the-united-nations-framework-conven-
tion-on-climate-change [https://perma.cc/AWJ6-V4YB].
31 See id.; The Paris Agreement, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLI-
MATE CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/
the-paris-agreement [https://perma.cc/9BFH-2F4N].
32 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
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above pre-industrial levels.33 As part of this overall goal, parties
must submit their nationally determined emissions contribu-
tions and review them every five years.34 The United States in-
tended to cut its 2005 contribution level by 26–28% by 2025.35
While the Paris Agreement does not specifically cover interna-
tional aircraft, it does address greenhouse gas emissions at
large.36 Therefore, the United States would be forced to account
for aviation emissions in achieving this reduction. While Presi-
dent Trump withdrew the United States’ participation in the
Paris Agreement in 2017, President Biden rejoined the agree-
ment in January 2021.37
B. CHICAGO CONVENTION AND ICAO
The Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago
Convention) created ICAO.38 ICAO is a United Nations organi-
zation that sets international aviation standards concerning
safety, security, efficiency, and environmental protection.39 It
also acts as a forum for cooperation amongst all related fields of
international civil aviation.40 ICAO works with the member
states of the Chicago Convention and other global aviation orga-
nizations to create international standards and recommended
practices.41 The Chicago Convention urges its member states to
33 Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change art. 2, ¶ 1(a), Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 [hereinafter Paris
Agreement].
34 Id. art. 4, ¶ 9.
35 INDCs as communicated by Parties, U.S. Cover Note, INDC and Accompa-




36 See Paris Agreement, supra note 33.
37 Nathan Rott, Biden Moves to Have U.S. Rejoin Climate Accord, NPR (Jan. 20,
2021, 5:45 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/inauguration-day-live-updates/
2021/01/20/958923821/biden-moves-to-have-u-s-rejoin-climate-accord [https://
perma.cc/HF2E-9V9G].





40 About ICAO, INT’L CIV. AVIATION ORG., https://www.icao.int/about-icao/
Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/MHY7-KH5C].
41 Convention on International Civil Aviation arts. 37–39, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat.
1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
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work towards uniformity in these regulations and standards.42
There are currently 193 member states, including the United
States.43
While ICAO creates standards for global aviation, nations are
free to adopt their own domestic standards that can be more or
less stringent than ICAO standards.44 If the nation chooses to
adopt less stringent regulations, it must notify ICAO of the dif-
ferences between its practices and ICAO requirements.45 How-
ever, the Chicago Convention requires member states to adopt
emission standards that are at least as stringent as ICAO stan-
dards to have their airworthiness certificates recognized interna-
tionally.46 Therefore, if a member state wants ICAO to continue
recognizing its airworthiness certificates, it must adopt standards
at least as stringent as ICAO standards.47
The first ICAO aircraft carbon dioxide emission standards
were proposed in 2016 and later approved in 2017.48 This new
proposal was meant to complement the Paris Agreement.49 In
negotiating ICAO carbon dioxide standards, the United States
recommended that the international standards’ purpose be to
reduce carbon dioxide emissions beyond “business as usual.”50
The selected standards “apply to new aircraft type designs from
2020 and to in-production aircraft type designs in 2023.”51 By
January 1, 2028, all in-production aircraft that do not meet the
standard will no longer be permitted to fly unless they are suffi-
ciently modified.52 These standards, their implementation, and
rulemaking are discussed below.53
42 Id.
43 Member States, INT’L CIV. AVIATION ORG. (Jan. 10, 2019), https://
www.icao.int/about-icao/pages/member-states.aspx (click “Member States List
(Multilingual)”) [https://perma.cc/B7ND-EEDJ].
44 Chicago Convention, supra note 41, art. 38.
45 Id.
46 Id. art. 39.
47 Id.
48 Press Release, Int’l Civ. Aviation Org., ICAO Council Adopts New CO2 Emis-
sions Standard for Aircraft (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.icao.int/Newsroom/
Pages/ICAO-Council-adopts-new-CO2-emissions-standard-for-aircraft.aspx
[https://perma.cc/K3G4-YVR4].
49 Puko, supra note 23.
50 Lynch, supra note 25.
51 Cirium, supra note 14.
52 Id.
53 See discussion infra Section IV.
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C. U.S. OBLIGATIONS TO ICAO STANDARDS
As previously discussed, ICAO standards are not directly en-
forceable against member states’ manufacturers.54 Once ICAO
standards are approved, a member state must adopt its own do-
mestic standards that are at least as stringent as ICAO stan-
dards.55 Member states who choose to vary their standards in any
way from ICAO standards must notify the organization.56 If a
member state fails to sufficiently satisfy ICAO requirements,
their airworthiness and type certificates will not be recognized
by other member states and, thus, cannot travel in their
airspace.57
D. CLEAN AIR ACT
In 1970, the U.S. government’s role in regulating air pollu-
tion and emissions shifted significantly: Congress passed the
Clean Air Act.58 This law allowed the creation of federal and
state regulations to limit emissions from both stationary and mo-
bile sources.59 In the context of aviation regulation, this legisla-
tion granted the EPA authority to regulate aircraft emissions.60
If an air pollutant from aircraft engines is found to endanger
public health or welfare, the EPA is required to regulate and cre-
ate standards.61
Section 231 of the CAA grants the EPA the authority to regu-
late certain pollutants from airline engines.62 Specifically,
§ 231(a)(2)(A) directs the EPA administrator to propose air-
craft engine emission standards for “any air pollutant . . . [that]
causes, or contributes to, air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”63 This direc-
tive does not prescribe what those standards must be but, in-
54 See Chicago Convention, supra note 41, art. 38.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. art. 39.
58 Evolution of the Clean Air Act, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-over-
view/evolution-clean-air-act [https://perma.cc/VD32-L9WE] (Oct. 8, 2020).
59 Id.; see generally 42 U.S.C. § 7401.
60 See 42 U.S.C. § 7571(a)(2)(B); Emissions Certification, FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,
https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/apl/noise_emis
sions/certifications/ [https://perma.cc/VTS5-S625] (July 1, 2014, 10:28 AM).
61 42 U.S.C. § 7571(a)(2)(A).
62 Id.
63 Id.
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stead, grants discretion to the EPA to create them.64 The D.C.
Circuit’s ruling in National Association of Clean Air Agencies held
that § 231 is given an “exceptionally broad” degree of discretion
to determine airplane engine emission standards.65 Section
231(a)(2)(B) directs the EPA to consult with the Federal Avia-
tion Administration (FAA) on these standards and prevents the
EPA from changing the standards if that “change would signifi-
cantly increase noise and adversely affect safety.”66
Section 231(b) allows the EPA to consult with the Department
of Transportation to ensure the effective date allows for the nec-
essary time to develop any needed technology resulting from
the new standards.67 The statute also requires reasonable consid-
eration of the cost to comply with the new standards.68 Section
232 directs the Secretary of Transportation to prescribe regula-
tions to ensure compliance with the EPA’s standards.69 The FAA
is also required to impose regulations that ensure compliance
with the standards.70 Section 233 grants the federal government
the exclusive authority to create aircraft engine emissions stan-
dards.71 States are preempted from adopting or enforcing any
aircraft emissions standards unless they are identical to the
EPA’s standards.72
E. 2016 EPA ENDANGERMENT FINDINGS
On August 15, 2016, during President Obama’s administra-
tion, the EPA released Endangerment Findings that gave the
EPA authority to regulate airline emissions.73 As described
above, § 7571(a)(2)(A) of the CAA requires the EPA to regulate
emissions that endanger public health or welfare.74 This finding
was a scientific assessment that aircraft emissions endanger pub-
64 Id.; see Nathan Richardson, Aviation, Carbon, and the Clean Air Act, 38 COLUM.
J. ENV’T L. 67, 83–96 (2013).
65 Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Air Agencies v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1221, 1229 (D.C. Circ.
2007).
66 42 U.S.C. § 7571(a)(2)(B)(i)–(ii).
67 See id. § 7571(b).
68 Id.
69 Id. § 7572(a).
70 Id. § 7571(a)(2)(B)(i); see Richardson, supra note 64, at 73.
71 See 42 U.S.C. § 7573.
72 See id.
73 See Finding That Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Aircraft Cause or Contrib-
ute to Air Pollution That May Reasonably Be Anticipated to Endanger Public
Health and Welfare, 81 Fed. Reg. 54,422 (Aug. 15, 2016) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 87, 1068).
74 42 U.S.C. § 7571(a)(2)(A); see discussion infra Section III.D.
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lic health and welfare, which satisfied the prerequisite to regu-
lating those emissions.75
First, the EPA recognized that elevated levels of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere endanger the public health and welfare
of current and future generations, aligning with the meaning of
§ 231(a)(2)(A).76 The specified greenhouse gases were carbon
dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, per-
fluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluorides.77 These are the same
air pollutants mentioned in the 2009 Endangerment Findings
under § 202(a) of the CAA that were the primary cause of cli-
mate change.78 Second, the EPA found the emissions of the six
greenhouse gases from certain classes of aircraft engines cause
or contribute to the air pollution that endangers public health
and welfare under § 231(a)(2)(A).79
In 2015, the EPA published these findings as an advanced no-
tice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM).80 An ANPRM is an an-
ticipatory notice that an agency is considering regulatory
action.81 The ANPRM discussed issues presented in ICAO pro-
ceedings on international carbon dioxide emission standards,
perhaps foreshadowing the rules that were to come in 2020.82
F. INTENDED LAWSUITS
In January 2020, several environmental groups notified the
EPA that they intended to sue the Agency for refusing to imple-
75 42 U.S.C. § 7571(a)(2)(A); see discussion infra Section III.D; Puko, supra
note 23.
76 Finding That Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Aircraft Cause or Contribute
to Air Pollution That May Reasonably Be Anticipated toEndanger Public Health
and Welfare, 81 Fed. Reg. at 54,440.
77 Id.
78 Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,497 (Dec. 15,
2009).
79 Finding That Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Aircraft Cause or Contribute
to Air Pollution That May Reasonably Be Anticipated to Endanger Public Health
and Welfare, 81 Fed. Reg. at 54,440.
80 Proposed Finding That Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Aircraft Cause or
Contribute to Air Pollution That May Reasonably Be Anticipated to Endanger
Public Health and Welfare and Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 80 Fed.
Reg. 37,758 (July 1, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 87, 1068).
81 Abbreviations, OFF. OF INFO. & REGUL. AFFS., https://www.reginfo.gov/pub-
lic/jsp/eAgenda/Abbrevs.myjsp [https://perma.cc/WQF8-84GC].
82 Proposed Finding That Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Aircraft Cause or
Contribute to Air Pollution That May Reasonably Be Anticipated to Endanger
Public Health and Welfare and Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 80 Fed.
Reg. 37,765–66 (July 1, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 87, 1068).
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ment aircraft emission regulations.83 The groups argued that
the 2016 Endangerment Findings required the EPA to promul-
gate regulations and that the Agency failed to do so.84 The EPA
suggested the proposed rule would come in September 2019.85
After this timeline passed, the EPA responded and claimed it
was working to propose a rule in 2020.86 Finally, in July 2020, the
EPA published its proposed rule for regulating carbon dioxide
emissions from aircraft.87
IV. SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE RULE
The EPA’s new regulations are the first emissions standards
for commercial airlines and large business jets.88 The regula-
tions are the exact standards ICAO created, which prevent man-
ufacturers from reverting to less efficient aircraft models.89 The
regulation will incentivize the development of more fuel-effi-
cient airplane models without letting the aviation industry revert
to older models.90 Aircraft manufacturers will be forced to up-
date and replace their old aircraft with more efficient models.91
This Section explores the new standards and what they require
from manufacturers in greater detail. Specifically, it addresses
the emission standards and procedures, the aircraft the stan-
dards apply to, the dates the regulations become effective, the
feasibility and cost considerations, the public hearing on the
regulations, and the comments formally received in response to
the regulations.
83 David Shepardson, U.S. Environmental Groups Plan to Sue Trump Administra-
tion on Airplane Emissions, REUTERS, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-air-
planes-emissions/u-s-environmental-groups-plan-to-sue-trump-administration-on-





87 Reese Oxner, U.S. Implementing 1st-Ever Airplane Emission Rules; Critics Say
They’re Ineffective, NPR (Dec. 28, 2020, 4:23 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/12/
28/950863508/u-s-implementing-1st-ever-airplane-emission-rules-critics-say-
theyre-ineffective [https://perma.cc/6H4K-WACZ].
88 Puko, supra note 23.
89 See id.
90 Czapla, supra note 29; Lee, supra note 28.
91 Lee, supra note 28.
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A. OVERVIEW
The EPA conducted an extensive peer review before issuing
the proposed rule.92 Such review is consistent with specific Of-
fice of Management and Budget requirements.93 One of the two
reports relied on discusses the technologies likely to be used in
compliance with the proposed standards and their associated
costs.94 The other report revolved around the methodology and
results of the emissions inventory modeling.95
The standards are considered “anti-backsliding” regulations,
meaning they prevent manufacturers from reverting to older,
less fuel-efficient aircraft.96 This type of regulation sets the floor
for future emissions.97 Aircraft being designed but not yet certif-
icated, and current in-production planes are subject to the regu-
lations.98 Notably, in-service aircraft are not covered by the new
standards.99 In order to have flexibility amongst aircraft models,
the emission standards are based on a mathematical formula
that accounts for several different factors.100
B. EMISSION STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES
The EPA first notes the importance of harmonizing with
ICAO’s carbon dioxide standards to consistently regulate inter-
national transactions.101 The EPA’s standards match the “scope,
stringency, and timing” of the carbon dioxide standards used by
ICAO.102 As mentioned above, the metric used to set the emis-
sion standards is a mathematical formula.103 The metric mea-
sures fuel efficiency,104 which is directly related to carbon
dioxide emitted by aircraft engines.105
92 Control of Air Pollution from Airplanes and Airplane Engines: GHG Emis-
sion Standards and Test Procedures, 86 Fed. Reg. 2136, 2137 (Jan. 11, 2021) (to




96 Id.; Lee, supra note 28; Puko, supra note 23.
97 Czapla, supra note 29.
98 Control of Air Pollution from Airplanes and Airplane Engines: GHG Emis-
sion Standards and Test Procedures, 86 Fed. Reg. at 2136, 2138.
99 See id.
100 Id. at 2142–43.
101 Id. at 2148.
102 Id. at 2144.
103 Id. at 2172.
104 Id. at 2144.
105 Id. at 2145; Fuel Efficiency, INT’L AIR TRANSP. ASS’N, https://www.iata.org/
en/programs/ops-infra/fuel/fuel-efficiency [https://perma.cc/7FXM-ZVUQ].
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The fuel efficiency metric was designed as a formula to ac-
count for differences in airplane types, designs, technology, and
uses.106 ICAO designed its standards to “differentiate between
fuel-efficiency technologies” of aircraft and “equitably capture
improvements in propulsive and aerodynamic technologies.”107
Because of the difficulty in identifying a standardized empty
weight of each plane, the metric is based on maximum takeoff
mass (MTOM) rather than overall weight.108 Because of this,
compliance will not be easily accomplished by simply using
weight reduction technologies.109
The carbon dioxide metric takes an average of three “Specific
Air Range (SAR) test points” normalized by a reference geomet-
ric factor that represents the physical size of the plane.110 SAR
points measure the distance a unit of fuel will take an air-
plane.111 Measurements of these points are taken at three weight
points to give an accurate idea of the range of “day-to-day” air-
plane operations.112 The measurements are correlated against a
plane’s MTOM, as it is an already certificated reference point.113
Comparison between the reference point and the measurement
will determine if an airplane complies with the regulations.114
C. APPLICABLE AIRCRAFT AND EFFECTIVE DATES
In sum, the EPA’s rule applies to manufacturers of civil sub-
sonic jet airplanes with an MTOM of more than 5,700 kilograms
and civil subsonic propeller-driven airplanes with an MTOM
greater than 8,618 kilograms.115 The timing and stringency
levels depend on where an airplane is in the development pro-
cess.116 The standards become effective immediately for a new
type design, with an application submitted for certification on
or after January 11, 2021.117 If the new type design has an
MTOM of 60,000 kilograms or less and has nineteen passenger
106 Control of Air Pollution from Airplanes and Airplane Engines: GHG Emis-







113 Id. at 2146.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 See id. at 2145.
117 Id. at 2137.
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seats or fewer, the standards apply for certification applications
submitted on or by January 1, 2023.118 Compliance for in-pro-
duction planes will be required beginning January 1, 2028.119
A notable category of aircraft that the EPA does not cover in
its rule is in-service planes.120 Before the EPA proposed the rule,
it considered applying the standards to aircraft already in ser-
vice.121 Ultimately, the EPA decided not to require airplanes cur-
rently in use to comply with the new standards, sparking outrage
amongst many environmental groups.122 However, certain modi-
fications made to in-service airplanes that increase greenhouse
gas emissions will trigger a requirement to follow the standards
beginning January 1, 2023.123
The definitions of “in-production” and “new type design” are
critical because falling under the terms implicates which effec-
tive date by which a manufacturer is required to comply.124 An
in-production plane is an airplane that has already received a
Type Certificate from the FAA and manufacturers either have
“existing undelivered sales orders or would be willing and able
to take new sales orders.”125 A Type Certificate is the FAA’s ap-
proval that “ensures [ ] the manufacturer’s designs meet the
minimum requirements for airplane safety and environmental
regulations.”126 Each new type design airplane is issued a Type
Certificate once unless the design is modified throughout its
production.127
A new type design airplane has “never been manufactured
prior to the compliance date of a rule,” but the manufacturer
has applied for the original certification with the FAA.128 These
new type designs are very infrequent and typically take eight to
ten years to develop fully.129 Therefore, manufacturers must re-
ceive sufficient notice so they can make design modifications
118 Id. at 2138.
119 Id.
120 See id.
121 Lynch, supra note 25.
122 Id.; Shepardson, supra note 83.
123 Control of Air Pollution from Airplanes and Airplane Engines: GHG Emis-
sion Standards and Test Procedures, 86 Fed. Reg. at 2138.
124 See id. at 2147.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 2147 n.78.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 2147.
129 Id.
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and receive certifications.130 For new type designs, the standards
applied at the time of certification usually remain frozen for five
years to allow for approval.131 Because of the significant time
and money invested in developing a new type design, manufac-
turers stress the importance of having future standards at least
eight years in advance.132
D. FEASIBILITY AND COSTS
Before exploring the feasibility studies and costs, the EPA
made special note of the market considerations for the aviation
industry.133 The aviation industry is uniquely global.134 Planes
and their parts are sold worldwide, and to continue to support
this market, the EPA argues that international regulatory com-
pliance is critical.135 The EPA explains that if the United States
decided to enforce more stringent standards, manufacturers
would no longer be able to receive international FAA certifica-
tion and would thus have to seek it through other certifying
bodies.136 This certification is a key factor in airlines’ purchasing
decisions.137 A change in standards could potentially put U.S.
manufacturers at a competitive disadvantage in exporting their
aircraft.138 With this market consideration in mind, the EPA
heavily focused on reaching standards that are already feasible
for manufacturers.139
In analyzing the technological feasibility of the new standards,
the EPA used a study performed by an outside contractor.140
The contractor conducted a detailed literature search, held sev-
eral interviews with aviation industry leaders, and conducted
modeling to estimate the cost of modifying in-production
planes.141 The study concluded by projecting that the proposed
rule would not require manufacturers to make technical im-
provements to their aircraft that would not happen if the rule
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 See id. at 2147 n.90.






139 Id. at 2165–66.
140 Id. at 2165.
141 Id. at 2166.
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were not promulgated.142 Most of the aircraft in-service already
surpass the new emission standards.143 Additionally, the few in-
production airplanes that do not meet the carbon dioxide stan-
dards are at the end of their production life.144 These planes are
anticipated to go out of production before the 2028 effective
date and be replaced by newly developed models that meet the
standards.145
E. PUBLIC HEARING
The EPA held a virtual public hearing on September 17,
2020.146 The purpose of this hearing was to receive comments
from any interested parties on the newly proposed rule.147 Au-
thority for this hearing is given under § 307(d) of the CAA.148
Each presenter had five to ten minutes for the oral presentation
of their remarks.149 In total, twenty different parties gave their
virtual testimony.150
1. Disappointed Parties
The majority of parties who gave their testimony at the hear-
ing expressed disappointment with the proposed rule and the
EPA’s decision-making.151 The resounding theme of the major-
ity’s concern was the need for more stringent regulations on car-
bon dioxide emissions given the urgency that climate change
poses.152 The common argument among the disapproving par-
ties centered around ICAO’s failure to provide a sufficient stan-
dard.153 Many shared that the findings and research relied on by
ICAO used outdated data.154 Some suggested that the ICAO
standards are insufficient at large and conflicts with the goals of
142 Id. at 2167.
143 Id. at 2166.
144 Id. at 2167–68.
145 Id. at 2168.
146 Public Hearing for Control of Air Pollution from Airplanes and Airplane
Engines: GHG Emission Standards and Test Procedures, 85 Fed. Reg. 52,514
(Aug. 26, 2020) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 87, 1030).
147 PUBLIC HEARING, supra note 7, at 6.
148 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d); PUBLIC HEARING, supra note 7, at 8.
149 PUBLIC HEARING, supra note 7, at 9, 11.
150 See generally id.
151 See id. at 12, 21, 41–51, 64–86, 91–98.
152 See id.
153 See id. at 13, 48, 50, 72.
154 See id. at 14, 48, 72.
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the Paris Agreement.155 After noting ICAO’s lackluster efforts,
several commenters emphasized the EPA’s opportunity to take
aggressive measures.156
While many of the participants represented large organiza-
tions and groups, several proud, private citizens were also willing
to voice their concerns.157 Similar to Brian Gannon, their testi-
monies revolved around their anecdotes and experiences.158
Many testifiers live close to large airports and shared how the
increased pollution and emissions severely impacts the air qual-
ity of their neighborhoods.159 They share deep concerns for the
world their children will be handed one day.160 Increased child
asthma, higher COVID-19 morbidity rates, and increased cancer
cases are all characteristics these neighborhoods share.161 Kent
Palosaari’s nonprofit, Mira’s Garden, built a community garden
underneath the landing area at the SeaTac International Air-
port.162 Kent had the vegetables from the garden tested by the
University of Arizona and found the garden’s produce was too
toxic to consume safely.163 While these commenters spoke
mainly from personal stories and experiences rather than scien-
tific data on greenhouse gases, they felt obligated to share how
climate change impacts their lives every single day.164 They
strongly urged the EPA to take advantage of this regulatory op-
portunity to slow greenhouse gases’ impacts on the planet.165
2. Satisfied Parties
On the other end of the spectrum, many members of the air-
line industry and manufacturers expressed their full support for
the EPA’s proposed rule.166 The most prevalent argument from
this group was the need for harmonization with ICAO’s global
standard.167 They argued that having a “patchwork” of standards
155 Id. at 22.
156 Id. at 42, 70.
157 See id. at 41–46, 48–51, 64–73, 81, 83, 85, 91, 93.
158 See id.
159 See id.
160 See id. at 64–73, 81, 83, 85, 91, 93.
161 See id. at 75, 83, 91, 93.
162 Id. at 91–93.
163 Id. at 92.
164 See id. at 41, 64, 77–78, 83, 91.
165 Id.
166 See id. at 24–37, 54–62, 87–90.
167 See id. at 27, 36, 62.
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would create an unnecessary level of uncertainty.168 Relying on
the fact that most of the domestically manufactured aircraft are
exported, they argued that having a different standard than the
rest would wreak havoc on the airline industry’s economic viabil-
ity.169 In order to remain competitive in the market, the United
States needs to follow the unified standard.170 Even further,
COVID-19 has already dramatically changed the outlook of
airlines.171
Another common argument the supporters discussed was the
aviation industry’s own efforts to innovate and reduce emis-
sions.172 Peter Prowitt, an executive director of global govern-
ment relations for GE Aviation, shared many of GE Aviation’s
developments in the area of fuel efficiency.173 A significant por-
tion of the research and development budget for GE Aviation
focuses on fuel efficiency.174 The captain of a 737 U.S. legacy
airline, Kathi Hurst, also discussed the importance of the bigger
picture.175 Hurst noted that aircraft engine technology is only
one component of reducing greenhouse gas emissions.176 Other
areas, including air traffic control technology, individual airport
configuration, and pilot operating techniques, all contribute to
emissions.177
F. NOTICE AND COMMENT
Following agency requirements,178 the EPA opened the sixty-
day notice and comment period from August 19, 2020, to Octo-
ber 19, 2020.179 The EPA received 124 publicly submitted com-
ments.180 Similar to the testimony given in the evidentiary
168 Id. at 62.
169 See id. at 27, 36, 62.
170 Id. at 35–36.
171 See id. at 35, 55.
172 See id. at 30, 54, 88.
173 Id. at 29.
174 Id. at 30.
175 Id. at 59.
176 Id. at 60.
177 Id. at 60–61.
178 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
179 Gordon Gilbert, U.S. EPA Publishes Aircraft Emissions Proposal, AINONLINE
(Aug. 24, 2020, 9:17 AM), https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/business-
aviation/2020-08-24/us-epa-publishes-aircraft-emissions-proposal [https://
perma.cc/W77A-49EG].
180 Comment Letters on Proposed Rule for Control of Air Pollution from Air-
planes and Airplane Engines: Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Test Pro-
cedures, REGULATIONS.GOV, https://www.regulations.gov/document/EPA-HQ-
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hearing, there were two primary voices in the submitted com-
ments: those from the aviation industry and those representing
environmental protection groups.181 The manufacturing and
aviation industry representatives reaffirmed their overall sup-
port of the EPA’s proposed rule, while the environmentalists
maintained their disapproval of the standards.182 The EPA ad-
dressed various submitted comments in the finalized rule.183
The main issue the EPA recognized from the comments was the
stringency of the standards.184
Concerning this stringency, the EPA recognized two main ar-
guments presented in the submitted comments.185 The EPA
noted that the relevant provisions under the CAA “confer an
unusually broad degree of discretion on the EPA to adopt air-
craft engine emission standards as the [a]gency determines are
reasonable.”186 Important factors to consider in adopting tech-
nology-based standards include cost, emission reductions, safety,
and noise.187 Balancing the feasibility of technology-forcing stan-
dards and the safety of pushing technology too quickly, the EPA
determined the anti-backsliding regulations are sufficient.188
While the final rule recognized various arguments for altering
the proposed rules, the EPA only changed a minor reporting
provision.189
V. ANALYSIS OF THE RULE
The anti-backsliding emissions standards are not sufficient for
actually reducing carbon dioxide emissions. This Section ex-
plores this shortcoming and the tensions between aviation in-
OAR-2018-0276-0001/comment [https://perma.cc/2BWK-S7EL] [hereinafter
Comment Letters].
181 Gordon Gilbert, EPA’s Aircraft Emissions Rule Signed into Law, AINONLINE
(Dec. 29, 2020, 10:30 AM), https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/business-
aviation/2020-12-29/epas-aircraft-emissions-rule-signed-law [https://perma.cc/
WF2Q-MEYV]; see generally Comment Letters, supra note 180.
182 Gilbert, supra note 181; see generally Comment Letters, supra note 180.
183 Control of Air Pollution from Airplanes and Airplane Engines: GHG Emis-
sion Standards and Test Procedures, 86 Fed. Reg. 2136, 2156 (Jan. 11, 2021) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 87, 1030).
184 Id. at 2156–58.
185 Id. at 2157.
186 Id.; see Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Air Agencies v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1221, 1229–30
(D.C. Cir. 2007).
187 Control of Air Pollution from Airplanes and Airplane Engines: GHG Emis-
sion Standards and Test Procedures, 86 Fed. Reg. at 2157.
188 Id. at 2158.
189 Id. at 2138.
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dustry groups and environmental groups. Specifically, it
addresses the United States’ freedom to differ from ICAO stan-
dards, the ways the standards violate the CAA, the airline indus-
try’s fuel-efficiency development, and the finding that the
regulations are arbitrary and capricious. This Section ends by
noting the most recent developments and lawsuits regarding the
new regulations.
A. THE EPA IS NOT STRICTLY BOUND TO ICAO STANDARDS
First, any standards or recommended practices ICAO promul-
gates are not directly binding on the United States.190 While
ICAO aims to promote unity in global standards, there is an al-
lowance for deviation among member states.191 If a member
state becomes so negligent to fall below ICAO standards, “[o]nly
national governments can consider holding other countries” ac-
countable.192 Normally this accountability is in “the form of
country-to-country sanctions.”193 When disagreements between
member states occur, they are typically solved through settle-
ment and arbitration.194 If member states do not reach a resolu-
tion through these mechanisms, they can lose their voting rights
in the voting assembly.195 If a member state refuses to follow a
final order after arbitration or settlement, member states can
revoke airworthiness certificates and bar the noncompliant
member state’s aircraft from flying through their territories.196
To date, there have only been five disputes that fall under this
governing article in the Chicago Convention.197 Out of these
five cases, ICAO Council has never decided on the merits of the
cases.198 Instead, member states resolved each case through me-
diation and negotiation.199 There is an extensive dispute process
190 Frequently Asked Questions: If My State is Being Negligent in its Responsibilities
Under the Chicago Convention, Can ICAO Reprimand or Penalize it in Some Manner?,
INT’L CIV. AVIATION ORG., https://www.icao.int/about-icao/FAQ/Pages/icao-fre-
quently-asked-questions-faq-2.aspx [https://perma.cc/6QC5-WANZ] [hereinaf-
ter ICAO Reprimand].
191 Chicago Convention, supra note 41, art. 38.
192 ICAO Reprimand, supra note 190.
193 Id.
194 Chicago Convention, supra note 41, arts. 84, 85.
195 Id. art. 88.
196 Id. art. 87.
197 Mathieu Vaugeois, Settlement of Disputes at ICAO and Sustainable Development,
in OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES: SUSTAINABLE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION 1, 4
(McGill Univ. Ctr. for Rsch. in Air and Space L. ed., 2016).
198 Id. at 6.
199 Id.
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before member states revoke certificates, and it would take sig-
nificant noncompliance with ICAO standards to reach this
point.
The aviation industry’s support of the new rule largely relies
on the need for uniform, global standards.200 They argue that
without these standards, the United States’ airworthiness certifi-
cates will no longer be recognized by ICAO, creating a competi-
tive disadvantage for United States aircraft manufacturers.201
Aside from considering ICAO’s complex dispute system, this ar-
gument also ignores the plain language of ICAO require-
ment.202 The requirement says member states’ standards must
be at least as stringent as ICAO standards if they want their airwor-
thiness certificates to be recognized.203 The only way for a certifi-
cate to be denied recognition is if the member states’ standards
fall below the strength of ICAO standards.204 Nothing in this re-
quirement prevents the EPA from going beyond ICAO stan-
dards and having more stringent standards.205
The aviation industry’s argument that different regulations
would revoke their airworthiness certificates suggests that envi-
ronmental groups want less stringent standards.206 This logic
mischaracterizes the request of environmental proponents. The
problem is not with the regulation in general; the problem is
with the stringency—or lack thereof—of the standards. The se-
verity of climate change demands standards that actually reduce
200 Coral Davenport, E.P.A. Proposes Airplane Emission Standards That Airlines Al-
ready Meet, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/22/
climate/airplanes-climate-change.html [https://perma.cc/U82V-PH8A].
201 Gen. Elec. Co., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule for Control of Air Pollu-
tion from Airplanes and Airplane Engines: GHG Emission Standards and Test
Procedures (Oct. 19, 2020), https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-
OAR-2018-0276-0157 [https://perma.cc/D8SJ-9UXS].
202 See Chicago Convention, supra note 41, art. 38.
203 International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), SKYBRARY, https://www.sky
brary.aero/index.php/International_Civil_Aviation_Organisation_(ICAO)
[https://perma.cc/AST3-ZRAG] (Apr. 3, 2019, 2:04 PM); see Chicago Conven-
tion, supra note 41, art. 33.
204 See Chicago Convention, supra note 41, art. 33.
205 See Mark Edward Peterson, The UAV and the Current and Future Regulatory
Construct for Integration into the National Airspace System, 71 J. AIR L. & COM. 521,
559 n.197 (2006).
206 See Env’t Def. Fund, Inst. for Pol’y Integrity at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of L., Mont.
Env’t Info. Ctr., Nat. Res. Def. Council, Sierra Club & Union of Concerned Scien-
tists, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule for Control of Air Pollution from Air-
planes and Airplane Engines: GHG Emission Standards and Test Procedures 18
(Oct. 19, 2020), https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-OAR-2018-
0276-0183 [https://perma.cc/3CJA-KX8J].
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emissions.207 Stronger standards could do this without disquali-
fying the United States from using the ICAO certification pro-
cess.208 An example of a vastly different regulatory scheme for
emissions is the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU
ETS). The Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for Inter-
national Aviation (CORSIA) is ICAO’s global offsetting scheme
used by airlines and aircraft operators.209 EU ETS is a cap-and-
trade emissions regulatory scheme for nations in the EU.210
While both frameworks have similar goals, they accomplish
them in vastly different ways. Nonetheless, EU ETS and ICAO
negotiated to allow both systems to coexist.211 There are signifi-
cant administrative challenges to existing side-by-side, but until
ICAO implements CORSIA, EU ETS only applies to flights in
the European Economic Area.212 If EU ETS and ICAO can coin-
cide, then more stringent standards from the EPA will not be a
problem.
Further, if a member state decides to adopt a more stringent
standard, the only burden is the requirement to notify ICAO of
any differences in their rule from ICAO standards.213 These dif-
ferences are published by the FAA in the Aeronautical Informa-
tion Publication (AIP).214 Every member state publishes an AIP,
which is updated on a twenty-eight-day cycle.215 The AIPs of
each member state are readily available online.216 Annex 16 to
the Chicago Convention discloses the differences from ICAO
207 See Elizabeth Dunbar, Is 2030 the Deadline for Climate Action?, MINN. PUB.
RADIO NEWS: CLIMATE CURIOUS (Oct. 22, 2019, 4:04 PM), https://
www.mprnews.org/story/2019/10/22/climate-curious-is-2030-the-deadline-for-
climate-action [https://perma.cc/4BKX-SCN2].
208 See Chicago Convention, supra note 41, art. 33.
209 CORSIA Explained, AVIATION BENEFITS BEYOND BORDERS, https://avia-
tionbenefits.org/environmental-efficiency/climate-action/offsetting-emissions-
corsia/corsia/corsia-explained/ [https://perma.cc/BK68-GKZ7].
210 EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/
clima/policies/ets_en [https://perma.cc/5UX9-3RTC].
211 Reducing Emissions from Aviation, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/
clima/policies/transport/aviation_en [https://perma.cc/M5DA-7PX7].
212 Id.
213 Chicago Convention, supra note 41, art. 38.
214 Aeronautical Information Publications (AIPs), SKYBRARY, https://
www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Aeronautical_Information_Publications_(AIPs)
[https://perma.cc/4TWH-EAP3] (July 20, 2017, 1:44 PM).
215 Id.
216 See Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Resources: Electronic AIPs by Country (Al-
phabetical), EMBRY-RIDDLE AERONAUTICAL UNIV.: HAZY LIBR. & LEARNING CTR.,
https://erau.libguides.com/UAS/eAIP [https://perma.cc/99CV-NNEC] (July
12, 2021, 11:51 AM).
304 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [86
standards regarding environmental protection.217 There are
countless changes noted in the AIP for aircraft noise alone.218
Therefore, it appears to be at least possible to stray from the
exact ICAO standards.
In fact, not only is it possible, but it has also happened before.
The EPA did this when they phased out in-service aircraft due to
noise on a faster timeframe than called for by ICAO stan-
dards.219 ICAO allowed member states with “serious airport
noise problems” to implement the phase-out program more ag-
gressively.220 Not only was this a change from ICAO standards,
but it also came with compliance costs nearing at least $2.1 bil-
lion, according to the 1990 General Accounting Office report.221
Promulgating more stringent emissions standards would not be
the first break from ICAO standards for the United States.
Beyond the notification requirement, ICAO does not stand in
the way of the EPA adopting more stringent carbon emissions
standards. As long as the EPA promulgates standards at least as
stringent as ICAO’s, the airworthiness certificate will be recog-
nized. Thus, without the risk of losing recognition of the certifi-
cates, there is not a competitive disadvantage for having more
stringent standards.
B. EPA STANDARDS VIOLATE THE CLEAN AIR ACT
The primary purpose of the CAA is pollution prevention.222
Congress defined “pollution prevention” as “the reduction or
elimination, through any measures, of the amount of pollutants
produced or created at the source.”223 The entire goal Congress
217 Chicago Convention, supra note 41, annex 16.
218 See GEN 1.7 Differences from ICAO Standards, Recommended Practices, and Proce-
dures, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/
atpubs/aip_html/part1_gen_section_1.7.html [https://perma.cc/Y39E-LDAU]
(Aug. 5, 2021).
219 49 U.S.C. § 47528(a); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO-01-1053, AVIATION AND
THE ENVIRONMENT: TRANSITION TO QUIETER AIRCRAFT OCCURRED AS PLANNED, BUT
CONCERNS ABOUT NOISE PERSIST 1, 35 (2001), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-
01-1053.pdf [https://perma.cc/97F9-4PAG] [hereinafter AVIATION AND THE
ENVIRONMENT].
220 Int’l Civ. Aviation Org., Agenda Item 2: Review of Aviation Emissions Related
Activities Within ICAO and Internationally: Parallels Between Noise and CO2 Environ-
mental Goals ¶ 2.2 (Int’l Civ. Aviation Org. Working Paper No. GIACC/3-IP/1,
2009), https://www.icao.int/environmental-protection/GIACC/Giacc-3/Giacc3_
ip01_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GWM-PM5Z].
221 AVIATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 219.
222 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)–(c).
223 Id. § 7401(a)(3).
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had in mind with the CAA was actually to reduce pollution and
emissions.224 As previously discussed, for the EPA to regulate
emissions, the EPA must demonstrate the pollutant “endan-
ger[s] public health or welfare.”225 Following this directive, the
EPA would not be able to regulate emissions if there was not a
clear need to reduce its impact on society’s health and wel-
fare.226 It logically follows that such regulation should actually
reduce emissions.
The EPA’s transparency regarding the new rule’s impact has
been crystal clear: no anticipated reduction in emissions.227 As
explicitly stated in the final rule, the EPA does not expect a rea-
son for “manufacturers to make technical improvements to their
airplanes that would not have occurred in the absence of the
rule.”228 There is effectively no change happening that would
not happen without the rule.229 Not only does the current tech-
nology in place already meet the standards, but in 2019, aircraft
were already 6% more fuel-efficient than the standards re-
quire.230 The very few planes that do not already comply with
the new standards will be out of use before the effective date in
2028.231
In the National Association of Clean Air Agencies case, the D.C.
Circuit Court found that the EPA is not compelled to regulate at
the “greatest degree of emission reduction achievable.”232 Fur-
ther, the circuit court agreed that the EPA is not required to
“achieve a ‘technology-forcing’ result” and has large discretion
in “determining what standard is most reasonable for aircraft
224 The Clean Air Act, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, https://
www.ucsusa.org/resources/clean-air-act [https://perma.cc/3C4Q-XF7W] (Feb.
1, 2012); see Statement by President George Bush upon Signing S. 1630, 26
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1824 (Nov. 19, 1990).
225 42 U.S.C. § 7571(a)(2)(A); see discussion supra Section III.D.
226 See 42 U.S.C. § 7571(a)(2)(A).
227 Lee, supra note 28; see Control of Air Pollution from Airplanes and Airplane
Engines: GHG Emission Standards and Test Procedures, 86 Fed. Reg. 2136, 2165
(Jan. 11, 2021) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 87, 1030).
228 Control of Air Pollution from Airplanes and Airplane Engines: GHG Emis-
sion Standards and Test Procedures, 86 Fed. Reg. at 2167.
229 Press Release, Annie Petsonk, International Couns., Env’t Def. Fund, EPA’s
Proposed Aircraft CO2 Standard Wholly Insufficient to Tackle Climate Change
(July 22, 2020), https://www.edf.org/media/epas-proposed-aircraft-co2-stan-
dard-wholly-insufficient-tackle-climate-change [https://perma.cc/7G8R-DWN8].
230 Cirium, supra note 14.
231 Control of Air Pollution from Airplanes and Airplane Engines: GHG Emis-
sion Standards and Test Procedures, 86 Fed. Reg. at 2167.
232 Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Air Agencies v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1221, 1226 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (citations omitted).
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engines.”233 In this case, the EPA lowered permissible nitrous
oxide emissions reductions from 16% to 12% to reflect the new
ICAO standards.234 The court found that the EPA was not re-
quired to adopt the more stringent measures simply because
they reduced emissions the most.235 However, there is a signifi-
cant distinction between the nitrous oxide emissions regulations
and the new carbon dioxide emissions: the carbon dioxide regu-
lations do not reduce current emissions at all.236 The nitrous ox-
ide regulation options were between varying reduction
percentages, while the new carbon dioxide standards do not re-
duce emissions in the first place.237 The National Association of
Clean Air Agencies case emphasizes the EPA’s regulatory discre-
tion, but the new standards do not even qualify for this permit-
ted deference.
In sum, the new carbon dioxide emissions standards for air-
craft do not meet the CAA requirements. The EPA is granted
significant deference in choosing the appropriate and reasona-
ble standards, but there must be an actual reduction for this
deference to apply. The EPA’s new standards fail to accomplish
this.
C. THE INDUSTRY IS READY FOR MORE STRINGENT STANDARDS
Aviation manufacturers and industry leaders insist on the im-
portance of having necessary lead times of eight to ten years.238
Manufacturers design planes eight to ten years in advance, so it
is important they consider the appropriate standards that will be
in place that far in the future.239 Because of this extended lead
time, these obsolete standards will lock the requirements in
place for at least a decade.240 The effective date for the new stan-
233 Id.
234 Id. at 1225.
235 Id. at 1230.
236 See Control of Air Pollution from Airplanes and Airplane Engines: GHG
Emission Standards and Test Procedures, 86 Fed. Reg. at 2167.
237 See id.
238 Id. at 2147; see generally John Andrew Marsh, Framework and Strategies for
Reducing Aircraft Lead Time (May 9, 2014) (M.B.A. thesis, MIT Sloan School of
Management, and M.S.M.E. thesis, MIT Department of Mechanical Engineer-
ing), https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/90755/891370270-
MIT.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/BVL4-9BJJ].
239 Control of Air Pollution from Airplanes and Airplane Engines: GHG Emis-
sion Standards and Test Procedures, 86 Fed. Reg. at 2147.
240 U.S. EPA Finalizing First-Ever Airplane Emissions Rules, CNBC, https://
www.cnbc.com/2020/12/28/us-epa-finalizing-first-ever-airplane-emissions-rules-
.html [https://perma.cc/E9AB-KDW8] (Dec. 28, 2020, 11:47 AM).
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dards is 2028—seven years from now.241 In the last ten years,
aviation emissions increased by 44%.242 If this pace is kept, emis-
sions will triple again by 2050.243 While recognizing the impor-
tance of giving the aviation industry time to adjust to new
standards, there must be some level of compromise.
The CAA was not ignorant of the necessary lead time aircraft
manufacturers uniquely require. Section 231(b) of the Act man-
dates EPA regulations take effect only after the necessary period
“to permit the development and application of the requisite
technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of com-
pliance.”244 On the other hand, there is not unlimited time for
the aviation industry to increase its fuel efficiency.245 Many ar-
gue that the CAA was intended to be “technology-forcing.”246
Technology-forcing is a strategic regulatory scheme that estab-
lishes “currently unachievable and uneconomic performance
standards to be met at some future point in time.”247 There is
usually an allotted period for industries to research and develop
technology that complies with the new standards.248 This
scheme is often thought to incentivize technology development
and innovation better than other regulatory methods.249 There
is usually an asymmetry of information between industries and
Congress.250 Industries may tend to “exploit this information
asymmetry by” minimizing their actual technology capabilities,
“underinvesting in R&D, and claiming that the standards cannot
be met.”251 Congress is often in no position to disagree because
241 Control of Air Pollution from Airplanes and Airplane Engines: GHG Emis-
sion Standards and Test Procedures, 86 Fed. Reg. at 2148.
242 XINYI SOLA ZHENG & DAN RUTHERFORD, INT’L COUNCIL ON CLEAN TRANSP.,
FUEL BURN OF NEW COMMERCIAL JET AIRCRAFT: 1960 TO 2019 1 (2020).
243 Id.
244 42 U.S.C. § 7571(b).
245 See Dunbar, supra note 207.
246 Note, Forcing Technology: The Clean Air Act Experience, 88 YALE L.J. 1713,
1714–16 (1979).
247 John Miranowski, Technology Forcing and Associated Costs and Benefits of Cel-
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of its lack of information.252 Technology-forcing standards en-
courage innovation while also effectively regulating emissions.
The best example of technology-forcing standards is the
CAA’s standards for automobile emissions.253 Smog and pollu-
tion from cars were growing out of control in the 1950–60s.254
Technology-forcing policies were adopted after trouble with col-
lusion amongst automobile industry members attempting to dis-
courage stronger emission standards.255 Amendments to the
CAA in 1970 allowed for infeasible standards, and the Supreme
Court in Union Electric Co. v. EPA agreed the scheme was in-
tended to incentivize “rapid improvements in air pollution con-
trol technology.”256 The EPA reported that “new passenger
vehicles are 98–99% cleaner for most tailpipe pollutants” than
in the 1960s.257 “[L]evels of lead in the air decreased by 94%
between 1980 and 1999.”258 The EPA even claims this improve-
ment is from EPA vehicle emissions standards and says they “di-
rectly sparked the development and implementation of a range
of technologies.”259
Aviation industry members urge the EPA not to impose
stricter standards because of the cost to manufacturers to invest
in new technology. In the long run, reductions in air pollution
prove to be very cost-effective.260 The EPA states that Americans
receive nine dollars’ worth of benefits to public health and the
environment for every dollar spent on emission reduction pro-
grams.261 On top of that, jobs are created to enforce the emis-
sions reduction programs. The EPA proudly states that the
“vehicle emissions control industry employs approximately
65,000 Americans with domestic annual sales of 26 billion.”262
Further, this argument completely disregards the significant
growth the aviation industry has already achieved. There is an
252 Id.
253 Miranowski, supra note 247.
254 Gerard & Lave, supra note 250, at 765–66.
255 Miranowski, supra note 247.
256 Id.; see Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 256–58 (1976).
257 History of Reducing Air Pollution from Transportation in the United States, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/transportation-air-pollution-and-climate-change/accom-
plishments-and-success-air-pollution-transportation [https://perma.cc/BE95-






2021] AIRCRAFT CARBON EMISSION REGULATIONS 309
industry-wide strategy of cutting 2005 net carbon emissions in
half by 2050.263 This goal pushes the aviation industry to develop
its fuel-efficient technologies.264 U.S. aircraft have improved
their fuel efficiency by nearly 40% between 2000 and 2019.265
Airlines and manufacturers are investing millions in creating
more sustainable aircraft.266 Airbus recently unveiled their fleet
of zero-emission aircraft powered by hydrogen technology
rather than kerosene-based fuel and hope to begin flying by
2035.267 Airbus is also exploring a propeller aircraft or blended
wing concept, comparable to the U.S. military aircraft B-2 Spirit.
Similarly, Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner sparked a new generation
of planes, which increased fuel efficiency by nearly 25% from its
older aircraft.268 This wave of innovation is not limited to the
dominating corporations like Airbus and Boeing.269 A Colorado
aerospace startup, Boom, is drawing attention for its plan of
building a Concorde-like aircraft that uses sustainable fuels but
can also break the sound barrier.270 Both Japan Airlines and Vir-
gin Atlantic Airways have invested in the startup.271 The U.S. Air
Force has contracted Boom to study supersonic transportation
as a potential future Air Force One aircraft.272 San Francisco has
partnered with Neste, a Finnish company, to support alternative
fuel options.273 Neste recently announced a collaboration with
Shell to produce more biofuel options.274 JetBlue also commit-
ted to utilizing sustainable fuels for its flights from the San Fran-
cisco airport.275 While technology-forcing standards would cause
potential disruption to manufacturers, their efforts clearly
would not be starting from zero. The aviation industry’s innova-
tion has grown far more than it may suggest.
263 Cirium, supra note 14; Lynch, supra note 25.
264 Lee, supra note 28.
265 Id.
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In the end, the aircraft manufacturing industry is not entirely
unprepared for advancing fuel-efficiency technology. Industry
leaders across the globe are moving in this direction without the
new regulations. Thus, adopting stricter standards would only
encourage more movement.
D. THE STANDARDS ARE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS
The EPA’s new standards for aircraft emissions were passed as
informal rulemaking under § 553 of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act.276 While agencies are usually granted significant defer-
ence in making decisions and promulgating rules, a rule may be
set aside under judicial review if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”277
A court cannot replace its judgment with the agency’s judg-
ment, but the agency “must examine the relevant data and artic-
ulate a satisfactory explanation for its action.”278 The EPA rules
are arbitrary and capricious if the agency “relied on factors
which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed
to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an ex-
planation . . . that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency . . . .”279 In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of the United
States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. the
United States Supreme Court found that the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) rescission of the auto-
matic seatbelt requirement was arbitrary and capricious.280 The
Court held that failing to consider modifying the automatic
seatbelts and failing to give any suitable explanation for chang-
ing its approach made the EPA’s action arbitrary and capri-
cious.281 Further, the EPA did not sufficiently consider whether
airbags would be an appropriate replacement for automatic
seatbelts.282 Overall, the EPA’s failure to explain its reasoning
and assessment of alternatives was arbitrary and capricious.283
Here, the EPA’s decision-making closely aligns with the
NHTSA’s. The CAA, in § 231, mandates important factors to
276 5 U.S.C. § 553.
277 Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 403 (1971).
278 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 30 (1983).
279 Id. at 43.
280 Id. at 46.
281 Id. at 48.
282 Id.
283 See id.
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consider in creating aircraft emissions standards.284 These fac-
tors include how emissions contribute to air pollution; endan-
germent of public health and welfare; and noise, safety, and
technology requirements.285 Notice that Congress did not in-
clude considerations of global unity and aviation industry bene-
fit in the statute.286 Nearly the entire justification for the rule is
based on the competitive advantage for the aviation industry to
have globally unified standards.287 There is no explanation of
how the new standards will reduce emissions, affect air pollu-
tion, or benefit public health.288 The statute even allows the EPA
to reject certain standards if they create a hazard to air safety,
but the EPA does not even mention safety concerns.289 Nowhere
in the rule does the EPA adequately explain how the new stan-
dards will accomplish the goals of the CAA.290 The EPA over-
relied on impacts to the aviation industry and global unity, mak-
ing this action arbitrary and capricious.291
As discussed in the comment submitted by Earthjustice and
several other advocacy groups, the EPA did not adequately con-
sider appropriate alternatives to the new standard.292 In the
rule, the EPA briefly mentions that it considered two other alter-
native standards, but ultimately, the alternative standards were
not worth the burden of breaking with global harmonization.293
One of the alternatives was moving the effective date up by five
284 42 U.S.C. § 7571.
285 Id. §§ 7571(a)(2)(A), (b)–(c).
286 See id. § 7571.
287 See Control of Air Pollution from Airplanes and Airplane Engines: GHG
Emission Standards and Test Procedures, 86 Fed. Reg. 2136, 2165–66 (Jan. 11,
2021) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 87, 1030).
288 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Earthjustice, Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth
& Nat. Res. Def. Council, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule for Control of Air
Pollution from Airplanes and Airplane Engines: GHG Emission Standards and
Test Procedures 13 (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.regulations.gov/comment/
EPA-HQ-OAR-2018-0276-0150 [https://perma.cc/X7BU-PWFD].
289 42 U.S.C. § 7571(c).
290 Ctr. for Biological Diversity et al., supra note 288.
291 Christopher Surgenor, US Environmental Groups Say Proposal by EPA to Adopt
Rules Equivalent to ICAO Aircraft CO2 Standards Is Illegal, GREEN AIR (Nov. 9, 2020),
https://www.greenairnews.com/?p=303 [https://perma.cc/B43N-W5P6?type=
image].
292 Ctr. for Biological Diversity et al., supra note 288.
293 Control of Air Pollution from Airplanes and Airplane Engines: GHG Emis-
sion Standards and Test Procedures, 86 Fed. Reg. 2136, 2145 (Jan. 11, 2021) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 87, 1030).
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years.294 The EPA found this rule had limited additional costs
but offered no greater reduction in emissions.295 This is because
even in five years’ time, all but one noncompliant plane model
will be at the end of its term.296 The second alternative also
moved up the effective date but imposed more stringent stan-
dards as well.297 The EPA found that this approach gave greater
reductions in emissions with limited costs, but not enough to
justify breaking from global standards.298
Notably, this second alternative was the scheme the United
States supported in negotiations for ICAO standards.299 ICAO
discussed ten sets of standards in choosing which one to
adopt.300 The two alternatives the EPA considered were both op-
tions for ICAO standards.301 The standard that ICAO chose was
not the standard the United States supported.302 But, similar to
the State Farm case, the EPA did not explain why it no longer
thought this alternative was sufficient.303 Wouldn’t the EPA have
data and studies to support this alternative during ICAO negoti-
ations?304 Suddenly, the EPA no longer supported the standard
and failed to disclose why in the new rule.305 Instead, the EPA
stated that the alternative is not worth “deviating from the inter-
national standards and disrupting international harmoniza-
tion.”306 The EPA must adequately explain why its previously
294 EPA, EPA-420-R-20-028, AIRPLANE GREENHOUSE GAS STANDARDS: TECHNICAL
SUPPORT DOCUMENT (TSD) 130 (2020), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.
cgi?Dockey=P1010U0W.pdf [https://perma.cc/22QB-ZMBA] [hereinafter TECH-
NICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT].
295 Control of Air Pollution from Airplanes and Airplane Engines: GHG Emis-
sion Standards and Test Procedures, 86 Fed. Reg. at 2145.
296 TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 294.
297 Id.
298 Control of Air Pollution from Airplanes and Airplane Engines: GHG Emis-
sion Standards and Test Procedures, 86 Fed. Reg. at 2145.
299 TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 294, at 131.
300 Id. at 123–24.
301 Id. at 131.
302 See generally United States Position on the ICAO Aeroplane CO2 Emissions Stan-
dard, EPA (Feb. 1–12, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document/EPA-HQ-
OAR-2018-0276-0002 (click “Download”) [https://perma.cc/6UYZ-PYHL].
303 See Control of Air Pollution from Airplanes and Airplane Engines: GHG
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Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
304 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity et al., supra note 288.
305 See Control of Air Pollution from Airplanes and Airplane Engines: GHG
Emission Standards and Test Procedures, 86 Fed. Reg. at 2145.
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supported rule is no longer worth pursuing.307 Because the EPA
failed to discuss its change of mind, its action is arbitrary and
capricious.308
Earthjustice’s submitted comment also raised a crucial issue
with how the EPA analyzed the second alternative.309 The EPA
concluded that emissions reductions with this alternative were
limited because of the impacts from one airplane model—the
Airbus A380.310 In the Technical Support Documents to the
rule, the EPA fully acknowledged that although one model
largely influenced the analysis, the analysis was done before
Airbus announced the end of production of that exact model.311
So, the analysis results for the second alternative are no longer
accurate, but the EPA failed to give the option adequate consid-
eration in light of this announcement.312 Accordingly, this be-
havior is blatantly arbitrary and capricious because the EPA used
an inaccurate and outdated analysis for the alternative.313
Ultimately, given the failure to sufficiently consider congres-
sionally mandated factors, overreliance on external factors, and
inaccurate analysis of alternatives, the EPA action is clearly arbi-
trary and capricious.
E. FUTURE ACTION
In January 2021, eleven states and the District of Columbia
strongly urged the EPA to strengthen the newly adopted stan-
dards.314 The state attorneys general, led by California, argued
that the EPA must adopt more effective standards to mitigate
existing and growing climate damage.315 Other states joining the
fight include Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Vermont, and Wash-
ington.316 On January 15, 2021, a coalition of environmental
groups including Earthjustice, Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth,
307 See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 46–51.
308 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity et al., supra note 288.
309 Id. at 16.
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USKBN2742QI [https://perma.cc/G6UE-QCYW] (Oct. 19, 2020, 3:19 PM).
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and the Center for Biological Diversity filed a lawsuit in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit against the EPA.317 This
group attacked the Trump administration for its obsolete stan-
dards and urges the court to challenge the adoption of the
standards.318
President Biden campaigned on a strong platform for envi-
ronmental protection and policy.319 Many of his promised poli-
cies include the Green New Deal, net-zero emissions, and
stronger infrastructure to withstand the impacts of climate
change. President Biden began to roll out these policies by re-
joining the Paris Climate Agreement.320 On January 20, 2021,
President Biden signed the executive order, “Protecting Public
Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle
the Climate Crisis.”321 This executive order highlights several
regulations and policies the administration seeks to reevaluate
to promote climate protection, specifically in aviation.322 On
January 27, 2021, President Biden signed a similar executive or-
der titled “Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad”
that mentions similar goals as the aforementioned executive or-
der.323 While these promises and steps are in the right direction,
the partisan nature of climate change often dampers strong pol-
icies.324 The future of emissions regulation appears unclear.
VI CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the EPA’s new aircraft carbon emissions stan-
dards fell short of providing effective change. Climate change
impacts every facet of the environment, and greenhouse gases
317 Press Release, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Lawsuit Challenges Trump Ad-
ministration’s Failure to Cut Airplane Climate Pollution: First-Ever Airplane
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produced from emissions drive the damage. The EPA’s proud
claim that this is a milestone in climate protection is deceptive.
The finalized rule adopted the equivalent of ICAO standards,
which an overwhelming majority of manufacturers already meet.
Because of these obsolete standards, aircraft carbon emissions
levels will be locked in for years to come. The aircraft industry
praises the EPA for its commitment to global harmonization.
Environmental activists correctly criticize the sufficiency of the
standards for several reasons. First, the EPA created a fictitious
barrier by claiming they cannot impose more stringent stan-
dards than ICAO. The EPA also violated the CAA by not
promulgating standards that actually reduce emissions. Addi-
tionally, the aviation industry drives its fuel-efficiency technolog-
ical developments and is prepared to take a step further in this
direction. And lastly, the EPA’s action is arbitrary and capricious
because the EPA failed to adequately consider alternatives and
relied too heavily on external factors. It is vital for the protec-
tion of our planet that the EPA reconsider the emissions stan-
dards that satisfy these legal obligations.
